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CASE NOTES'
retibution, deterrence nor rehabilitation will
accomplish these goals in all cases. There is no one
reason why a person commits a crime, and no one
type of punishment fits all criminals. What is
punishment for one person may be of no effect to
others. Some criminals are sensitive to pain, others
to humiliation, others to confinement, and another
may require guidance for the results of the punish-
ment to be successful.
-', One may become discouraged with rehabilita-
tion or deterrence when he sees a high rate of
recidivism, but this does not necessarily mean that
the theories are invalid. This may be the result of
inadequate facilities and methods of use to ac-
complish the goals or the lack of total commitment
to-any one goal.
, ,There is also the distinction between intellectual
and emotional acceptance of the aims of~punish-
ment. While one may find retribution intellectually
unacceptable, there still may exist an emotional
need to strike back at the wrongdoer, just as one
kicks the chair which he stumbles over in the dark.
One may approve of rehabilitation, but when an
abhorrent or heinous crime is committed, he
demands swift and merciless infliction of punish-
ment.
Society should have an understanding of each of
the goals of punishment and methods of achieving
them. It should recognize the limitations. Sodety
should acknowledge the justification used in each
particular case, so that it can commit itself to
those methods which will help achieve, not impede
the attainment of the desired goal.
CASE NOTES
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Miranda Applies To Routine Tax Investigation
-Matis v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 1503 (1968).
Defendant was convicted on two counts charging
that he knowingly filed false income tax refund
clains against the government. Part of the evi-
dence on which the conviction was based con-
sisted of documents and oral statments obtained
from defendant by a government agent while
defendant was in jail serving a state sentence.
Before eliciting this information the government-
agent did not give any Miranda warning to de-
fendant. The district court rejected defendants
,ontention that the incriminating statements
should have been inadmissible because such
warnings were not given and the court of appeals
affirmed.
The United States Supreme Count reversed
and remanded the case holding Miranda does
apply to a "routine tax investigation". The court
stated that, although "routine tax investigations"
differ from other criminal investigations in that
they may be initiated for the purpose of a civil
action rather than criminal, tax investigations
frequently lead to criminal prosecutions ,as did
the one in this case. The court also rejected'the
government's position that Miranda warnings
were appliable only to questioning one,,who is
"in custody" in connection with the very case
under investigation stating there was no sub-
stance to such a distinction.
Justice White joined by Justices Harlan and
Stewart dissented. He stated that he would not
join the unexplained extension which the. court
is giving the Miranda decision into those civil
investigations which are frequently followed by
criminal inquiries. The dissent also argued that
the defendant was not "in custody" When the
statements were made as that term was used in
Miranda. Although defendant was confined in
jail he was at the time of interrogation in familiar
surroundings.
Involuntary Consent To A Search: Exclusionary
Rule V. Harmless Error-Bumper v. North] Car-
olina, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968). Petitioner, convicted
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of rape, contended that the rifle introduced in
evidence against him was obtained in a search
and seizure violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Several days after the crime, law
officers visited the home of petitioner's grand-
mother. When one of them announced that he
had a search warrant, the grandmother admitted
the officers. The record in the case casts much
doubt on the actual existence of a valid search
warrant, but the prosecutor informed the court
that he relied on the consent of the petitioner's
grandmother, rather than a warrant to justify
the search.
The issue before the Court was whether a
search can be justified on the basis of consent
when that 'consent' has been given only after
the police have asserted that they have a warrant.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to
prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily
given. When an officer announced that he has a
warrant, the situation was instinct with coercion.
Where there is coercion, even legal coercion,
there cannot be consent.
In his dissent justice Black argued that deter-
rence of illegal searches did not require blind
adherence to a mechanical formula requiring
automatic reversal where the exclusionary rule
had been invoked, especially when the evidence
overwhelmingly indicated that the petitioner
was guilty. The majority, however, indicated
that even though the Court's duty was not to
find guilt or innocence, but uphold the Constitution,
there was sufficient doubt as to the guilt of the
petitioner to justify reversal and remand.
Comment: The dialogue between justice Black
and the majority is another small indication of
the Court's reaction to continuing criticism evi-
denced in its opinions during the 1967-68 term.
Supreme Court Formulates Stop-and-Frisk
Rules-Terry v. State of Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968); Sibron v. State of New York, 88 S. Ct. 1889
(1968). In Terry, the defendant, convicted for
carrying a concealed weapon, claimed that the
guns were inadmissible since a police officer siezed
them without a warrant and thus violated the
Fourth Amendment. The plain clothes policeman
testified that he noticed the defendant and another
standing on a comer in Cleveland's shopping
district. The officer felt that "they didn't look
right" after ".. .he had developed routine habits
of observation over the years... ." He followed
the pair as they walked and stopped at various
stores, met with a third man for a short time and
then continued their pace. At this point, the
officer suspected the men of casing a store for a.
stick-up; he feared that they were armed. Thus,
he walked up to them, identified himself and
asked their names. When the men mumbled
something in reply to a question, the policeman
grabbed the defendant and patted down the
outside of his clothing; he felt a gun. He removed
it, frisked the other man and found another gun.
The lower court rejected the prosecution's
theory that the siezure of the guns was a search
incident to an arrest. The officer did not have
probable cause for an arrest. The United States
Supreme Court agreed, yet took the situation out
of the ambit of the traditional arrest cases. The
Court, after a careful consideration of the counter-
vailing interests of the individual's freedom from
unauthorized searches and the policeman's duty
to prevent and detect crime and his right to
self-protection, enunciated special rules governing
on-the-street confrontations. It is understandable,
the Court noted, to excuse the police from the
duty of securing a warrant when he suspects
possible criminal behavior while on the beat. A
warrant is not the sine qua non with regard to
Fourth Amendment standards. Rather, the test
as stated by the Court is a flexible, objective one:
"... would the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that
the action taken was appropriate?" Applying
that blanket rule to the facts in Terry, the Court
said that "[ilt would have been poor police work
indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in
the detection of thievery from stores in this same
neighborhood to have- failed to investigate this
behavior further". Further, a policeman must, for
his own safety, have the right to disarm people
he meets on the street. Thus, when an officer
believes a suspicious individual is armed and
dangerous, he is justified to conduct a limited
search for a gun.
justice Harlan, concurring, points out that the
frisk for the weapon is incident and automatic to
the right to stop. It is the right to stop the indi-
vidual-not the right to frisk him-which is the
crux of the controversy. This issue, justice Harlan
asserts, was ignored by the majority. justice
Douglas dissented. He argued that "probable
cause" is still the test for search and seizure; any
change of the standard should be accomplished
by a constitutional amendment only.
In the companion case, Sibron v. State of New
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York, supra, the Court had an opportunity to
apply the Terry rule to two fact situations. Justice
Harlan, concurring, believed that the majority
neglected to apply Terry even though it was
mentioned in the case.
The defendant had been arrested for possession
of heroin after a police officer had grabbed the
packets from him while detaining him on the
street. The only evidence upon which the officer
believed the defendant dangerous was that he
spent eight hours talking with persons known to
be narcotics addicts. The Court reversed the
conviction because the officer never showed that
he feared the defendant armed; the officer wanted
narcotics, not weapons. The Court explained:
"The search was not reasonably limited in scope
to the accomplishment of the only goal which
might conceivably have justified its inception-
the protection of the officer by disarming a poten-
tially dangerous man."
In a case joined with Sibron, a police officer
noticed two unfamiliar men tiptoeing in the hall
of his apartment building. He caught up with
them after a chase down a flight of stairs. He
frisked them at that point and found burglar's
tools for the possession of which the men were
convicted. The Court explained that while the
Terry rule might be applicable since the officer
reasonably suspected that he was in danger, the
search would be better justified as a search incident
to an arrest since there was probable cause. The
seizure of the men after the chase was the arrest,
since it was a curtailment of freedom; the following
search and seizure of the tools was incident to
that arrest.
Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that Terry
allowed the officer to stop in the latter mentioned
case; the frisk was merely incidental to the right
to stop. This gives significant leeway to police
and, even though the test is stated to be an ob-
jective one, ".... it seems.., proper to take into
account a police officer's trained instinctive judge-
ment operating on a multitude of small gestures
and actions impossible to reconstruct."
Comment: Terry and Sibron leave unclear the
Fourth Amendment requirements with regard
to those convicted of possession of a weapon. These
cases give the police the right to seize weapons
based upon less than objective grounds. Only
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be
armed and dangerous is needed. No longer must the
policeman prove "probable" or "reasonable" cause
which was necessary for the issuance of a warrant
or an arrest with an incidental search. These
rules apply regardless of what crime is charged if
the suspect is arrested.
If the charge is possession of a weapon, the
evidence, which is the basis for conviction, can
be seized as part of the policeman's right to stop-
and frisk. Thus, none of the usual Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees are needed in possession of
weapons cases. A warrant is now irrelevant since
reasonable cause is no longer important; the law
of arrest on probable cause is now inapplicable
with regard to convictions of possession of weap-
ons. The Court should state the precise effects
of Terry and Sibron upon the crimes of possession
of weapons and clear up potential confusion in
this area.
Failure To Give Notice Of Authority And Pur-
pose Before Opening Unlocked Door Vitiated
Arrest-Sabbath v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 1755
(1968). Defendant was convicted of knowingly
importing cocaine into the United States and
concealing it in violation of federal statutes. The
narcotics admitted into evidence, over objection,
were seized at defendant's apartment after custom
agents had knocked on the apartment door,
waited a few seconds, and, receiving no response,
opened the unlocked door and entered. The Court
of Appeals, on appeal, ruled that the officers in
effecting entry in this manner did not "break
open" the door within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§3109 and therefore were not required by that
statute to make a prior announcement of "au-
thority and purpose."
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case holding that the method of entry vitiated
the arrest and therefore the narcotics seized
should not have been admitted in evidence. The
Court stated that it would be a "grudging ap-
plication" to hold that the use of "force" is an
indispensable element of the statute. It has been
held, the Court continued, that §3109 applied to
entries effected by the use of a passkey which
requires no more force than does the turning of a
doorknob. "An unannounced intrusion into a
dwelling-what §3109 basically proscribes-is no
less an intrusion whether officers break down a
door, force open a chain-lock on a partially open
door, open a locked door by use of a passkey,
or, as here, open a closed but unlocked door."
Right To Jury Trial In State Courts When
Right To Jury Trial Would Be Available If Case
Were Tried In Federal Court-Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1966). Defendant Duncan,
1968]
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a Negro, was convicted of simple battery when
19 years old. The incident arose when he saw his
two younger cousins engaged in a conversation
by the side of the road with four white boys.
Knowing of racial incidents in a formerly all-
white high school to which his cousins had re-
cently transferred, Duncan approached the six
boys. Duncan and the white boys spoke to each
other. Duncan encouraged his cousins to break
off the encounter and get into his car, and he was
about to enter the car himself and drive away.
The white boys and a white onlooker testified
Duncan slapped one of the white boys on the
elbow before getting in the car. The Negroes
testified Duncan merely touched one boy. De-
fendant requested a jury trial, but the request
was refused and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
affirmed Duncan's conviction for simple battery.
The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which-were they to be tried in a federal court-
would come within the Sixth Amendment's guaran-
tee. Since we consider the appeal before us to be
such a case, we hold that the Constitution was
violated when appellant's demand for jury trial
was refused.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice
White, indicated that the question of which
provisions of the first eight amendments should
be applied to the states should be decided on the
basis of which particular procedures are funda-
mental and necessary to the American regime of
ordered liberty rather than on the basis of whether
a civilized system could be imagined without
these particular protections. It was on this basis
that the majority reached its conclusion. While a
fair and equitable criminal process which used no
juries could be imagined, no American state has
constructed such a system. The majority noted
that the laws of every state guarantee a jury trial
in serious cases and looked into history to em-
phasize how fundamental the jury trial is to the
American scheme of justice. The court overruled
dicta in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900),
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), to
the effect that the right to a jury trial is not es-
sential to ordered liberty and may be dispensed
with by the states.
Mr. Justice White indicated he did not feel
this decision would cause widespread changes in
state criminal procedures. There is a category of
petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to
the jury trial requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He recognized, however, that the
boundaries of this category are ill-defined. He
drew the line on the basis of existing laws and
practices in the country, referring to the definition
of petty offenses in the federal system-those
punishable by no more than six months in prison
and a $500 fine. While Duncan was sentenced to
serve 60 days in prison and pay a $150 fine, the
Louisiana law of simple battery provides for a
punishment of up to two years in prison and a
$300 fine. The majority felt that in this situation
it is the length of the sentence authorized rather
than the penalty actually imposed which is signifi-
cant. The legislative authorization of a heavy
penalty indicates a legislative judgment on the
seriousness of the crime.
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Doug-
las, concurred. He restated his position that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended tb incor-
porate totally and apply totally the Bill of Rights
to the states. He noted that the selective, incor-
poration doctrine of the majority could be sup-
ported as an alternative, even though less histori-
cally supportable, He also noted that the selective
incorporation process has now worked to make
most of the protections of the Bill of Rights appli-
cable to the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stew-
art, dissented. He criticized both the selective
incorporation position of Mr. Justice White and
the total incorporation position of Mr. Justice
Black as not historically supportable. But he
found the total incorporation view less objection-
able since this theory is at least internally con-
sistent. He interpreted "due process of law" to
mean that criminal trials must be fundamentally
fair and concluded that this fundamental fairness
does not require a jury trial in the present case.
Even if he were persuaded that trial by jury is a
fundamental right in some criminal cases, he
could find no historical basis for deciding that
Duncan's trial for simple battery fell into this
category.
Alcoholic Defendant Fails To Prove That His
Conviction For Public Drunkenness Violated The
Eighth Amendment-Powell v. Texas, 88 S. Ct.
2145 (1968). Leroy Powell was arrested in Decem-
ber of 1966 and charged with the offense of being
[Vol. 59
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found in a state of intoxication in a public place.
The statutory penalty consisted of a fine up to
one-hundred dollars. The trial judge in the county
court ruled that as a matter of law chronic alcohol-
ism is not a defense to the charge. The Texas
appellate process being exhausted, the defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court.
At his trial the defendant's chief witness was
Dr. Davis Wade, a fellow of the American Medical
Association, certified in psychiatry. His testimony
consisted of 12 pages of transcript relevant to the
present constitutional issue. The witness testified
that alcoholism is presently considered a disease
in the medical profession, but, however, there is
no universally accepted definition of it at the
present time. He concluded that a "chronic al-
coholic" is an "involuntary drinker" who is
"powerless not to drink" and who "looses his
self-control over his drinking." He testified that
the appellant was a "chronic alcoholic" who has
a compulsion to drink and who cannot control his
behavior by the time he has become intoxicated.
He stated that the defendant did not have the
will power to resist the constant excessive con-
sumption of alcohol.
On cross-examination Dr. Wade admitted that
when the appellant was sober he knew right from
wrong and then said that the appellant's conduct
in taking a first drink in any given instance was a
"voluntary excercise of his will." He said that
such persons as the defendant have a compulsion
to drink and that while it may not be completely
overpowering, it is a very strong influence.
The defendant testified to his history of drinking.
He had been arrested over 100 times for drunken-
ness, and he testified that he was unable to stop
drinking, and that when he was drunk he lost
control. He admitted having one drink that
morning, but the evidence is contradictory whether
he had only one because he had no more money
or because he knew he had to go to court that
day. The state made no effort to get expert testi-
mony for itself.
Following this short testimony the trial judge
indicated that he would not allow the defendant's
defense of chronic alcoholism. He did enter the
following "findings of fact."
1) Chronic alcoholism is a disease which de-
stroys the afflicted person's will power to resist
the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol.
2) A chronic alcoholic does not appear in public
by his own volition but under a compulsion symp-
tomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism.
3) Leroy Powell is a chronic alcoholic who is
afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism.
Mr. justice Marshall, writing the majority
opinion, said that whatever these are they are
not "findings of fact" in the traditional sense,
but rather more like the premises of a syllogism,
designed to bring the case within the scope of
the Court's opinion in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court said that this
trial did not reflect the full exposition of the
facts traditional in major constitutional cases.
The court observed that in the present state of
knowledge about alcoholism several types of
alcoholics have been defined. According to one
of the leading experts in the field, E. M. Jellinek,
only two types of alcoholics attain the degree of
physiological dependence to be said to be suffering
from alcoholism as a disease. These persons,
labeled gamma or delta alcoholics exhibit: a) in-
creased tissue tolerance to alcohol, b) adaptive
cell metabolism, c) withdrawal symptoms and
craving, i.e. physical dependence and, ,d) loss of
control. The Court notes that no attempt was
made to show that the present defendant exhibited
all of these symptoms. Especially, the Court was
not convinced that the defendant was powerless
to keep from taking the first drink. The Court
holds that it is unable to conclude on the state of
this record or on the current state of medical
knowledge that chronic alcoholics in general and
Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an
irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk
in public that they are utterly unable to control
their compulsion to begin drinking and their
compulsion to drink to the point of stupor, so
that they cannot be deterred at all from public
drunkenness.
This is not only a matter of lack of evidence
however. The Court states clearly its hesitancy to
announce a doctrine forbidding the incarceration
of persons for public drunkenness while the med-
ical profession has little more to offer, either in
knowledge or facilities, to treat these persons.
The Court envisions the prospect that the only
change that will take place is that a new sign
reading "Hospital" will be erected over a wing
of the jail. With the present system of penal
sanctions at least there is a maximum time of
permissible incarceration, which might not be
true if civil commitment acts were passed to
replace the criminal statutes struck down.
Finally, even if it were shown that both chronic
alcoholics in general and a specific defendant in
19681
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particular were unable to control their appearance
in public in a state of intoxication, because of the
disease of "chronic alcoholism"; and if there were
shown to be adequate alternative procedures to
handle the alcoholic, the four men in the majority
opinion (Justices Marshall, Black, Harlan and the
Chief Justice) still are not convinced that being a
chronic alcoholic is a defense to a charge of public
drunkenness on Eighth Amendment grounds.
The Court points out that the main thrust of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has been
directed at the method or kind of punishment
imposed and that the'nature of the conduct made
criminal is ordinarily relevant only to the fitness
of the punishment imposed. Robinson v. California,
supra, is an exception to this general thrust. In
that case a California statute making it a crime
to be a narcotic addict was struck down. The
majority in the present case say that the result
in Robinson was reached because the California
statute was attempting to punish a person for a
status. The present case, according to Mr. Justice
Marshall, on its face does not concern a status
crime. The defendant is not being punished for
chronic alcoholism but for the act of appearing
in public while intoxicated. Robinson only pro-
hibits criminal sanctions where there is no actus
reus, not where there is no mens rea. If such were
the case the majority fears that the Court would
inevitably be lead into the role of ultimate ar-
bitrator of the standards of criminal responsi-
bility in many areas of the criminal law.
Mr. Justice Marshall leaves some room for
maneuvering in the future by repeatedly referring
to the facts of the present case and hinting that at
some future time when alcoholism is better under-
stood and the facts of the case clearer, the Court
might find a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Not so Mr. Justice Black (justice Harlan joining).
In his concurring opinion he states that while he
agrees with the origional holding in Robinson,
that a status could not be a crime, that to extend
that doctrine now to permit the court to decide
what constitutes criminal responsibility would
be to invade the legislative province and destroy
much experimentation and local control in the
name of constitutional morality.
Mr. Justice White, whose concurrence in the
result gave the court its majority, held the way
he did solely on the facts. He argues that there
may be an Eighth Amendment prohibition against
applying criminal sanctions against a person who
is a chronic alcoholic. If an alcoholic proves that
for him resisting drunkenness is impossible and
that avoiding public places when intoxicated is
also impossible, this would provide him with a
defense to a public drunkenness charge. The
present defendant did not, in Mr. Justice White's
eyes, prove these facts. In his view the defendant
proved only that he was to some degree compelled
to drink and he was drunk when arrested.
The dissent (Mr. Justice Fortas speaking for
himself and Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Stewart) disagrees with the majority in both its
interpretation of the facts and the scope of the
Eighth Amendment. The dissent observes that
the Supreme Court does not generally sit as a
trial court. The Court should accept the findings
of the trier of fact as they were made and not as
the Court would have made them. The finding of
the trial court that Mr. Powell was a "chronic
alcoholic," that this constituted a disease which
so destroyed his volition that he could not avoid
appearing in public intoxicated, and that these
appearances were under a compulsion sympto-
matic of his disease, should be conclusive.
The dissent also sees as irrelevant the fact that
the state of medical knowledge in the field of
alcoholism is woefully lacking. What is known,
the dissent says, is sufficient to support the findings
in the present case. Thus, if the findings are not
actually true of the present defendant, there are
such persons, concerning whom these findings
would be proper and true.
Finally, the dissent sees being drunk in public
as a condition. The question presented to Mr.
Justice Fortas is whether a criminal penalty may
be imposed upon a person who is a "chronic
alcoholic" for being publicly intoxicated, when
this is a characteristic part of the pattern of his
disease; and is not a consequence of his volition
but rather a compulsion symptomatic of the
disease. If so then public intoxication is a con-
dition of the disease, and, the dissent says, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits
criminal penalities for this condition. It believes
that Robinson v. California stands for the simple
but subtle proposition that criminal penalities
may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a
condition he is powerless to change. The gravamen
of both this case and Robinson is this inability to
avoid the condition through the exercise of one's




Court Distinguishes Legal Rights From Strategic
Advice-People v. Iannidlo, 235 N.E.2d 439
(N.Y. 1968). The defendant was indicted for
contempt for evasive testimony before a New
York Grand Jury. He was called to testify con-
cerning a bribery conspiracy involving the police
and state liquor authority. He at first refused to
testify and was told by the assistant district
attorney that he was being called solely in the role
of a witness. He was told by the prosecutor, before
the grand jury, that the grand jury was ready to
confer immunity upon him if he considered any
answers he might have to give to be incriminatory.
The defendant said that he understood and con-
sented to being sworn.
Mr. Ianniello then was questioned concerning
certain conversations about police payoffs. He
stated he could not recall these conversations and
was reminded of the offer of immunity. So pressed,
the defendant asked if he could excuse himself to
see his attorney. He stated that he wished to ask
his attorney if this was a proper question. This
request was denied. The defendant persisted in
his request until the prosecutor suggested that
they go into open court and make an application
for a ruling. This was not done and the grand jury
foreman directed the witness to answer. He replied
that he did not recall the alleged conversations.
The questioning then turned to an alleged
meeting between the defendant and a police
sergeant, where the two discussed a confidential
investigation pending against a friend of the
defendant. Once again Mr. Ianniello stated that
he did not recall the conversation and could not
confirm or deny that it had ever occurred. This
testimony was the basis for the relevent contempt
charge.
The Supreme Court, New York County, dis-
missed the indictment on the grounds that the
defendant was denied the right to counsel when
he was refused permission to leave the grand jury
room to discuss the propriety of a question with
his counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed with
two judges dissenting. It did not reach the counsel
issue. Rather, it held that the defendant was
immune from prosecution for contempt since he
was a "target" of the inquiry.
The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated
the indictment. First, discussing the "target"
issue, the court held that its recent holding in the
case of People v. Tomasello, 234 N.E.2d 190 (N.Y.
1967), made the defendant subject to prosecution
for criminal contempt for- evasive testimony
before the grand jury whether or not he was a
possible defendant. In the Tonasello case the
court held that a witness before a grand jury who
is a possible target and has not received a statutory
transactional immunity for a previously committed
substantive offense could nevertheless be prose-
cuted for perjury on the basis of his present
testimony. The court reasoned that such a witness
enjoys the benefits of a state exclusionary rule
forbidding the use of his statements and any
"fruits" in a prosecution for a previously com-
mitted crime, and therefore, he should not also
be given the right to commit perjury. The court
in the present case said the same principle applies
where, as here, the contempt involves answers
so false and evasive as to be equivalent to no
answer at all.
Turning to the Supreme Court's ground for
dismissal, the refusal to permit the defendant to
consult with his lawyer, the Court of Appeals
first observed that a witness is not entitled to
have counsel present in the grand jury room. The
issue is when and to what extent the witness ought
to have the right to consult outside the grand
jury room. The court said that since the grand
jury proceeding is an investigation rather than a
prosecution, the witness has no right to be "repre-
sented" by counsel in the technical sense. It
recognised, however, that as a matter of fairness
the government should not compel the individual
to make important and binding decisions concern-
ing their legal rights in the enforced absence of
counsel.
The court listed three important legal rights
that it considered could be critically affected in a
grand jury proceeding. The first was whether to
assert or waive constitutional and statutory
privileges against self incrimination.' The'second
was the witness' right to refuse to answer questions
having no bearing on the subject of the investiga-
tion. The last was the right to envoke any special
testimonial privilege belonging to the witness, such
as a lawyer-client relationship.
The court distinguished this type of legal right
from mere strategic advice. In the latter case the
court held the witness has no right to see a lawyer.
If such a practice were established, the court
feared, it could be used as a delaying tactic to
disrupt grand jury proceedings. Since the present
defendant had already been given immunity and
since there was no question as to the propriety
1968]
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of the question and since the defendant could
apparently invoke no special privilege, he had no
right to counsel. Thus, to refuse him the right to
see a lawyer did not give rise to grounds for a
dismissal.
The court addressed itself in general to a witness'
demand for counsel. When a witness demands to
see his lawyer for counselling concerning his legal
rights he should be permitted to do so. If his
right is denied, however, the witness has no license
to commit perjury or contempt. His only recourse
is to persist in his refusal to answer, thus forcing
the prosecutor to take the matter into open court
for a ruling. In this way the court felt that the
proceedings could be expedited and the danger of
stalling tactics lessened. Where the witness persists
in frivolous objections the court could order him
to desist or stand in contempt. If the witness
und~e~takes to answer questions in an evasive
manner rather than refuse to answer he is subject
to contempt proceedings,
Comment: The Court of Appeals is rightly
concerned with the possibility of delaying tactics
being employed by witnesses if an unabridged
right to counsel were to be recognised. It seems to
believe-that the rule that is laid down in the present
case will shorten delays. Such a result is at best
speculative. In establishing this rule, however,
the court has created a situation where the witness'
privilege against self incrimination may be eroded
by prosecutorial abuse. Under the present ruling
the prosecutor can not loose. When the witness
requests a conference with his attorney the prose-
cutor can always refuse it. If the witness has no
such right the denial is irrelevent. If he does have
this right then apparently unless he persists in
demanding it his testimony may still be used in
contempt or perjury proceedings. If the state's
attorney permits a conference and to answer the
question would be damaging then surely the
attorney will advise his client to claim the privi-
lege. Thus, if the prosecutor can badger the witness
into either giving helpful and perhaps incriminat-
ing evidence or perjuring himself he gains. If
the witness steadfastly refuses to reply then the
state is in no worse position that if it had permitted
a conference. It is to be hoped that the Court of
Appeals and other New York courts will be alert
against excessive badgering by a prosecutor after
a refusal of counsel, and will dismiss indictments
returned for contempt or perjury where the witness
testifies after excessive practices.
State Must Prove Defendant's Sanity-People
v. Distrit Court for County of Jefferson, 439 P.2d
741 (Colo. 1968). Defendant was accused of
murder, and he entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity at the time of the crime. This
original proceeding was commenced by the District
Attorney to determine the constitutionality of a
statute which provides in part:
The burden shall be on the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was insane at the time of the alleged com-
mission of the crime. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §39
8-1 (1967).
The statute also provided for a separate trial of
the insanity issue prior to the determination of
guilt or innocence. The trial court found that this
statute violated the state constitution in placing
the burden of proof on the accused.
The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed. It
held that the statute violated the due process
clause of the Colorado Constitution, which is
identical to the one found in the United States
Constitution. It stated that the mental capacity
to commit a crime is a necessary ingredient of
any offense. Hence, due process demands that the
state prove the accused's sanity beyond a reasona-
ble doubt as it must establish any essential element
of the charge against him. It is not incumbent
upon the defendant to prove anything to the
satisfaction of the jury; rather, it is sufficient if
he succeeds in raising a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jury of any aspect of the case against
him.
The court stated that the fact there is a separate
proceeding to determine sanity cannot change this
long established principle. It noted that placing
the burden of proof on the defendant would not
violate the federal concept of due process, as was
decided in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
But it held that there is no requirement that due
process of law shall operate as a "straight jacket"
forcing every sovereign state to give no more, as
well as no less, protection than that which would
be recognized at the federal level.
In a strong dissent Justice McWilliams argued
that the sanity trial does not involve guilt or
innocence, but only the defendant's mental condi-
tion. Therefore, in this proceeding there is no
presumption of innocence by reason of insanity,
rather it is one of sanity. It is entirely proper for
the legislature to place the burden of disproving
this normal presumption on the defendant, as the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized
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in Lelald. The fact that a contrary practice has
prevailed for many years does not necessarily
mean that it has become a part of due process
that cannot be changed by the legislature. This is
especially true in this area since many states con-
tinue to put the burden of proof on the defendant.
Police' Interrogation Must Cease As Soon As
Defendant Once Asserts Miranda Rights-People
v. Fiorilto, 441 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1968). After the
defendant, a nineteen year old boy, was arrested
for the burglary of a grocery store, he was taken
to the police station for interrogation. He was
given the standard warnings regarding his con-
stitutional right to silence and to an attorney as
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and he initially refused to sign a waiver,
Almost immediately thereafter the officers con-
fronted the defendant with his two accomplices,
who told him that they had confessed and impli-
cated him in the crime. An officer again advised
the accused of his constitutional rights, inquiring
anew if he would like to sign the waiver and confess.
Defendant then signed the waiver and confessed
to the crime. The confession was admitted into
evidence, and the defendant was convicted of
burglary.
• On, appeal, the sole issue was whether the police
had violated the defendant's rights under Miranda
by continuing the interrogation after he had
initially refused to waive his constitutionally
rights. The court held that such conduct violated
his rights and reversed the conviction. The court
focused on language of the Miranda opinion
which specified:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any lime Prior to or during questioning,
that ie wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any state-
ment taken after the person invokes his privilege can-
not be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-
74 (1966).
The court emphasized that its holding forbade
continued questioning only after an individual
has once asserted his constitutional rights. It
pointed out that statements initiated by the
defendant himself in a similar situation would be
acceptable.
In a strong dissent justice Burke insisted that
the majority went beyond the requirements of
the Miranda decision. He would not require the
police to remain mute upon the defendant's refusal
to sign a waiver. He regarded the confrontation
of the accused with his accomplices as valid police
work. This, he maintained, introduced a new
factor into the questioning, which prompted the
defendant's change of mind. This resulted, in a
voluntary statement, free of any pressure or
trickery. He also rejected the majority's mandate
that a voluntary statement must be initiated by
the defendant after a waiver is once refused.,
Evidence Suppressed Due To Technical Viola.
tion Of Statute-State v. Jasso, 439",P.2d 844
(Utah 1968). Defendant was convicted of posses-
sion of marijuana. Prior to the defendant's arrest,
a police officer applied to a judge for, a search
warrant at the jurist's residence late at night.
The affidavit supplied by the officer stated hisuffi-
cient grounds for its issuance. The judge then
swore the officer as a witness and on the basis of
his oral testimony, issued the search warrant.
The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the ,con-
viction. It held that this procedure did, not satisfy
the applicable statute which provides:
Examination of complainant and witnesses.-The
magistrate must, before issuing the warrant,
examine on oath the complainant, and any wit-
nesses he may produce, and take their depositions
in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by
the parties making them. U. C. A. §77-54-4 (1953).
The court stated that the language of the statutes
is clear and cannot be construed as meaning that
a warrant may issue from an oral deposition of
the complainant or other witnesses.
In a strong dissent justice Ellett decried the
reversal of this conviction on such- technical
grounds. He failed to see how the defendant could
be harmed by the delay in signing the affidavit
as long as no question was raised as to the actual
facts testified to by the officer. Also, he condemned
the exclusionary rule in general:
However, the majority of this court seems tb be
running scared, and instead of recognizing that the
Mapp [Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1967)] case was
erroneously decided, they extend the concept to an
unnecessary length in order to free a guilty dope
peddler from a deserved conviction.
Search By Hotel Maid Does Not iolate'Right
Of Privacy-State v. Purvis, 438 P.2d 1002 (Ore.
1968). Defendant was convicted of the possession
of narcotics. Prior to his arrest, police'.officers
19681
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had enlisted the help of two maids who were
employed by the hotel at which the defendant
was staying. They instructed the maids to keep
all trash collected from the defendant's room
separate so that the officers could inspect it. When
a search of this material did not reveal any contra-
band, they instructed the maids to look further
for homemade cigarettes or cigarette butts. One
of the maids found such a cigarette butt on the
floor by the bed and brought it to an officer. He
tentatively identified it as a marijuana cigarette.
He later arrested the accused who was carrying
a quantity of the drug. The defendant contended
that the recruitment of the maids for the search
of his room constituted an unlawful invasion of
his constitutional right to privacy.
The Supreme Court of Oregon disagreed and
upheld the conviction. It reasoned that the maids
did not invade the defendant's privacy since they
were privileged to enter the room and did so in
the normal course of their activities. Also, they
showed to the police only those items which they
would normally take from the room. These items,
such as cigarette butts, which the defendant
placed in the waste baskets could be regarded as
abandoned property. Even though the cigarette
butt on the floor was not abandoned in this sense,
it was not distinguishable from any other trash
which the maids would usually remove from the
room. And the defendant had implicitly authorized
them to do so.
The police were not entitled to seize them, not
because the defendant claimed a right of privacy
therein, but, because the privacy of the room itself
would be invaded by a police search. This, however,
was not true in the case of the maids' entrance.
There was a strong dissent. The dissentor
argued that it was an invasion of the right to
privacy for the police to employ an agent to
accomplish what they themselves could not do.
He emphasized that they were directed to look
and search, not just to perform the mechanical
task of emptying waste baskets. This, he con-
tended, was merely an application of the long
discredited "silver-platter" doctrine, that is, the
authorities are handed evidence they could not
otherwise seize.
He also found this conduct forbidden by the
recent decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). He argued that the Supreme Court
in this case emphasized that the right to privacy
followed the person. He then said:
It would be a mistake to assume that Katz is
limited to the use of a mechanical agency (i.e.
wiretapping devices), not a human one. Katz pre-
vents any invasion, no matter how limited, with-
out constitutional safeguards.
Experiment Improperly Admitted Into Evi-
dence--Miler v. State, 226 N.E.2d 585 (Ind.
1968). Defendant was convicted of murder at a
jury trial. He contended in his defense that the
rifle had accidentally discharged when the de-
ceased attempted to grab it from him. The state,
however, maintained that he shot at the deceased
before he grabbed at the rifle. Hence, the distance
between the two men at the time the gun dis-
charged was a critical issue. If the victim was
standing several feet away when he was shot, he
could not have grabbed the rifle, causing it to
fire. To help resolve this question, the trial judge
admitted an experiment performed by a firearms
expert which demonstrated that the deceased was
at least five feet from the accused at the time of
the shot. The experiment purported to establish
that powder residue would have been left on the
deceased if he had been standing within five feet
of the defendant.
The Supreme Court of Indiana held that ad-
mission of this experiment was reversible error.
It noted that there were significant differences
between the conditions under which the experiment
was conducted and those at the time of the actual
shooting. The weapon used in the experiment was
not the same rifle as the defendant used. It was a
similar type, but there was no showing that it was
in the same condition as the defendant's rifle
which was never found. A different type of car-
tridge was utilized in the experiment. These
cartridges were hand-packed, while the bullets
found in the defendant's auto were commercially
packed. Finally, there was no showing that other
variables, such as atmospheric conditions and
weight of the bullets were the same as at the time
of the homicide. The court found that these differ-
ences rendered the experiment inconclusive since
all of the above factors can influence the distance
at which powder residue will remain on the victim.
Hence, the experiment was improperly admitted
into evidence.
Jackson v. Denno Applied Retroactively-
Duguay v. State, 240 A.2d 738 (Me. 1968). De-
fendant was convicted of murder. His trial took
place prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). This case
held that due process of law requires that the trial
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